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High population growth rates and declining soil quality in risky production and marketing
environments present a challenge to policy makers concerned with promoting the agricultural
intensification needed to address structural food deficits. This paper discusses efforts by
Sasakawa Global 2000 to introduce science-based technologies to farmers dealing with fragile
soils, inadequate rainfall, excessive pressure on natural resources and poorly developed
infrastructureall of which increase the production, price, income, and institutional risks
associated with agricultural intensification. The paper examines the profitability and risks
associated with the proposed technologies from both the researcher’s and the farmer’s
perspectives. Some farmers unexpectedly evaluate the technologies more favorably than
researchers. Agroeconomic and socioeconomic implications of these findings are discussed.
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1ACCELERATING AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION IN THE RISKIER
ENVIRONMENTS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSA)
1 The Challenge
There is a consensus that SSA lags behind the rest of the world in terms of agricultural
productivity.  This has serious implications for food security given rapid rates of population
growth, reduction in cultivable land per capita, and deterioration in soil quality due to continuous
cultivation with little restoration of nutrients or organic matter. On World Food Day the UN
released results of a recent study warning that continuing soil degradation in SSA will bring
about starvation and poverty on an unprecedented level with up to 60% of Africans going hungry
by 2025 (Financial Times, 16 October 1999).  Although some important increases in SSA
agricultural productivity have been realized in recent years, progress in food crops has been
slow.
Much of SSA’s food supply comes from coarse grains (millet, sorghum, maize) grown
using few improved inputs.  These crops are grown in less favorable agroecological
environments (poor soils, low and unreliable rainfall, high incidence of plant pests and diseases)
by farmers who are poorly linked to input, output, and credit markets.  There has been
substantial debate during the last two decades concerning the best approach for improving
agricultural productivity in these challenging environments. Some (Lipton 1989; Smith et al.
1994, Borlaug and Dowswell 1995) believe that agricultural development in SSA has good 
potential if farmers simply increase the use of improved technologies. Others (Harrison 1990;
Spencer 1995; Lynam and Blackie 1991) believe that SSA producers face enormous financial
constraints and risks so conserving and better using existing natural resources is the more
appropriate path.
2 The Sasakawa-Global 2000 (SG) Approach
Since the mid-1980s SG has been one of the key proponents of a high external input
approach for improving cereal production in SSA.  From 1986-96 SG implemented programs in
nine countries , focusing frequently on high potential crops and high potential zones. SG efforts
to increase yields through pilot programs that promoted 1/4-1/2 hectare demonstration plots
cultivated by farmers receiving inputs on credit from extension programs run by local ministries
of agriculture with assistance from SG have received much praise (though the sustainability of
the technology adoption remains a hotly debated issue, particularly where input, output, and
credit markets are poorly developed).  
In 1996, SG initiated new programs in Mali and Burkina Faso with the objective of
adapting SG methods to some of SSA’s most risk-prone production and marketing
2environments. As the severity of constraints associated with fragile soils, inadequate rainfall,
excessive pressure on natural resources, and poorly developed infrastructure increases; the
production, price, income, and institutional risk of introducing intensive production technologies
also rises. Under such circumstances, understanding the entire spectrum of  agroecological and
socioeconomic factors that influence production and income becomes very important. This paper
synthesizes the results from one year of multi-disciplinary research on SG’s introduction of new
millet technologies to farmers in the Segou Region of Mali and discusses the implications of
these results for all who are concerned with promoting agricultural intensification in high-risk
areas. 
3 Objectives and Methods
The objectives of this paper are to: (1) describe the program participants and the
technologies proposed, (2) present survey results concerning farmers’ perceptions of production
risks and the impact of SG technologies on these risks, (3) examine the role that prices and
degree of market integration play in farmers’ production/input use decisions, (4) present survey
results concerning the profitability of proposed technologies, and (5) discuss implications of
study results for agricultural intensification efforts throughout SSA. The analyses are based on a
survey of SG participant farmers conducted during the 1999 cropping season.  Data include
input/output parameters used to calculate crop budgets for both the SG test plot and a control
plot, farm/farmer characteristics, and qualitative information about risk perceptions and the role
that prices play in shaping production decisions.
4 Risk-Sensitive Technology Packages: An Incremental Approach
Although past SG programs have focused on high external input packages, the Sahelian
programs now underway are working with a variety of cost-reducing, efficiency-augmenting
techniques.  Another aspect is the use of incremental steps so that farmers can gradually move
from current practices to input-intensive practices, improving their skills and financial capacity
to work with new technologies year by year.  The Segou millet program offers farmers options
for three levels of intensification representing increasing costs, risks, and yields: (a) improved
seed and mildew protection, (b) package ‘a’ plus light/low-cost fertilization, and (c) package ‘a’
plus heavy/higher-cost fertilization.
Mildew, which can destroy as much as 60% of a millet crop, is a key constraint in the
region; hence, the Level A package is a short-cycle seed variety and an anti-mildew treatment
called Apron+.  Moving up to level B, farmers add an ‘improved’ compost -- normal compost
supplemented with rock phosphate. This option was just introduced in 1999 and results are not
yet available.  Level C -- for farmers having tried the first two levels as well as those willing to
3move directly to this level -- consists of improved seed, Apron+, compost, 25 kg/.25 ha of
natural phosphate (PNT), and 25 kg/.25 ha of NPK (bulk-blended 23-13-13 with S/MgO/Zn).
5 Participant Farmers
General Characteristics.  One of the most striking characteristics of participants is their
heavy reliance on millet production for food and income. Eighty-eight percent rank their
production for home consumption as their principal source of income; for 37% of this group,
home consumed production represents 75% or more of total household income from all sources
while for the remaining 63% it represents at least 50%.  Only 27% of participants claimed to
have other sources of income from which they would be willing to reimburse their input credit if
their millet crop failed.  On average, participant households comprised 17 persons and 10.3
hectares (about 0.6 ha per family member).  The principal crop is millet for 87% of participants,
sorghum for 7% and a millet/sorghum mix for 5%.  Other crops grown are peanuts (66% of
participants), Bambara nuts (55%), fonio (46%) and cowpeas (42%). Average levels of
productive resources include 3.7 traction animals, 2.4 non-traction animals, 1.8 animal drawn
plows/cultivators and 1.2 animal drawn carts.  Use of credit for agricultural purposes is not
common among participants; only 10% claimed to have agricultural credit other than that
obtained from SG. All but 26% had participated in earlier demonstration or model farmer
programs, yet only14% had some prior knowledge of the specific packages promoted by SG. We
do not have comparable statistics for the Segou Region in general, but our impression is that
these participants are generally better educated (43% of household heads able to read and write
in French, Bambara, or Arabic) and own more productive resources than the average farmers in
the region. 
Risk Perceptions. Farmers identified the three most important risk factors limiting their
agricultural production (we report scores of weighted frequencies: the most important problem
received a weight of 3, the second 2, and the third 1). In this Sahelian zone where one tends to
think of poor rains as the major constraint, farmers gave slightly more importance to the problem
of unreliable access to inputs (score of 132 for inputs vs. 116 for rain), with bird damage and
declining soil fertility coming in third and forth position (scores of 92 and 64). The importance
given to inputs suggests that this group of farmers already recognizes the ability of external
inputs to increase yields.  Having identified the three principal factors thought to increase
production risk, farmers evaluated the extent to which SG technologies were alleviating these
problems.  Their replies strongly contradicted the conventional wisdom that use of external
inputs (particularly expensive fertilizers) increases risks; most participants (96%) claimed that
the SG technologies reduced the risk of crop loss associated with the above mentioned
problems; only 3% -- all Level C farmers -- viewed the technologies as risk augmenting.
Farmers were asked to explain their perceptions concerning the impact of the SG
technologies on risk.  The most common reply (62%) was ‘generic’-- that the entire combination
4of inputs diminished the risk of getting very low millet yields (as discussed below, farmers risk
perceptions are shaped more by fears of  low productivity than concerns about financial risks
associated with input costs).  Reduction of risk due to attacks by birds, rats, and termites was the
next most common reply (16%); apparently the Apron+ makes seed unpalatable thereby
reducing animal/insect damage.  Several farmers (8%) commented that SG technologies reduced
risks associated with poor access to land because they could increase yields on existing land. 
Reduction of risks associated with poor rains was mentioned by 5% -- primarily a reference to
the shorter cycle seed varieties.  The key concern of the  3% of farmers indicating that SG
technologies increased risk was the problem of not being able to pay back the credit for the
relatively expensive Level C package.
Price Sensitivity and Market Participation. Adoption literature suggests that the primary
motivation for using new technologies, whether output is valued through the market or in home
consumption, is the opportunity to increase net income. We were surprised to find that many
participants did not appear to be evaluating the technology packages from a net income or profit
perspective. There is fairly strong survey evidence that millet production decisions for
approximately half the farmers interviewed are shaped more by a desire for cereal self-
sufficiency than by market prices and net income.  Forty-nine percent of farmers claimed that
1998 millet prices had no influence on their 1999 production decisions.  Over a longer time
period (1994-1999) 43% claimed that millet price had had no influence while 13% claimed that
price had occasionally influenced decisions and 44% claimed that price was always considered.
Among the 49% of farmers claiming that 1998 prices didn’t influence 1999 production
decisions, 53% pointed out that their planting decisions were based entirely on food self-
sufficiency objectives, 13% said that their goal was to increase production regardless of market
prices, 9% claimed that market prices were too volatile to be a factor in making production
decisions, another 9% indicated that millet prices were generally too low to stimulate production
of a marketable surplus (suggesting that price really does play a role in decisions!), and 6%
indicated that their goal was primarily food self-sufficiency -- sales were only considered in the
rare cases when production surpluses were achieved.
For the 51% of farmers who did use prices as input to 1999 production decisions, 47%
said that higher prices inspired them to increase and/or intensify production (some as a means of
avoiding purchases of high-priced cereals, others in an effort to market a surplus); 31% said that
price changes led them to diversify (generally moving out of millet into more profitable crops).
Much of the fertilizer adoption literature suggests that sustainable adoption is more likely
to occur among farmers who produce marketable surpluses of crops that can provide adequate
income to cover input costs.  The high degree of autarky prevailing among SG participant
farmers (37% declaring that more than 75% of income comes from home produced/consumed
production) and the large share of farmers (49%) apparently not considering prices in their
1A shortcoming of the partial budget analysis is that the slow-release phosphate rock is unlikely to have produced a
yield response in the year it was applied. A multi-year analysis of the package capable of measuring residual effects
could raise the profitability.
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production decisions raises serious questions about the long-run sustainability of adoption for the
relatively expensive Level C package.  Although some of the explanations as to why prices did
not influence production suggest that prices may play a more importance role than farmers
acknowledge, informal discussions with many participants suggest that there are few farmers
who have a clear strategy linking production and marketing decisions.
6 Profitability of Participants Test Plots
Although a focal point of the SG approach to technology promotion is the use of farmer-
managed control and test plots, the control plots frequently do not represent a true control
because farmers use normal practices.  What is normal can differ among farmers   some control
plots received applications of  inorganic fertilizers and/or Apron+, others received quantities of
manure that differed from those applied to the test plot, and others received nothing but
traditional seed.  This variability makes life easier for participants but it makes it difficult to
accurately measure the yield response and profitability of the recommended package. In an effort
to evaluate the impact of fertilizer recommendations we restrict the present analysis of the Level
C technology to participants who (1) did not use any fertilizer on their control plots and (2)
applied the same amount of manure on both the control and the test plots.
Partial budget results (Table 1)
show that in 1999 the Level A technology
(costing 1,025 FCFA/.25 ha plot) was
much more profitable than the Level C
technology (average cost of 7,173
FCFA/.25 ha plot).  All Level A farmers
realized positive returns. The value/cost
ratio for the package was 10 and the
average net benefit was 9615 FCFA. This
net benefit is the equivalent of what one
would earn by hiring out labor services for
13 days at the prevailing agricultural
wage. Farmers were unanimous in their
praise for this package.
Average returns to the Level C
package were 3858 FCFA and the
value/cost ratio only 1.5.1 Although a
common rule of thumb is that a v/c must
be at least two to stimulate demand for a
technology package (even three or four
Table 1.Yields and Benefits of SG Technologies 
Level A
Package
Level C
Package
Cases 40 26
Avg. yield increase 133 138
Avg. value of increased
production (FCFA)
10640 11031
Avg. supplemental cost
for test plot (FCFA)
1025 7173
Net benefit (FCFA) 9615 3858
Value/Cost ratio 10 1.5
Source: INSAH/MSU/SG 1999 survey data, Segou Region.
Notes:
(1) US$1.00 = 600 FCFA;
(2) Millet price is 80 F/kg (1998/99 mean in the study zone).
(3) Level C package costs is 8150 fcfa; average supplemental costs
are slightly less because we made adjustments for cases where
6in risky environments like the Sahel), 53% of the farmers thought the package was "profitable".
The average return masks a high degree of variability. Ten farmers had losses ranging from 1000
to 9000 CFAF. Four of these ten farmers who had losses from 1000 to 5000 CFAF, considered
the package profitable. Among the farmers with positive returns, 43% either found the package
unprofitable or only marginally so; returns for this group were in the 500-10,000 CFAF range.
The five farmers with returns greater than 10,000 FCFA were unanimous that the package was
profitable. 
Given the small sample size for the Level C technology package, linguistic problems
associated with translating words such as "profitable" into local languages, and participating
farmers’ limited experience with purchased inputs and agricultural production for commercial
purposes, we do not want to make too much of the apparent differences between the profitability
analysis and farmers’ perceptions of profitability at this point in time. Informal discussions with
farmers provide some insights. Several farmers appeared to have evaluated the technology from
a whole-farm perspective; although the cost of inputs was greater than the market value of
increased production, farmers valued the increased cereal production enough to cover input costs
with receipts from other farm activities (animal or peanut sales). In the long run, producing more
millet on less land frees up land (and perhaps labor) for production of other crops. Another
insight from informal discussions was that many farmers in this drought-prone zone (where one
measure of social standing is the number of full granaries a household possesses) might have
been more interested in maximizing cereal production than cash income. These insights suggest
that SG may want to spend more time in the future doing profitability analyses jointly with
farmers in an effort to improve researchers’ and extension agents’ understanding of farmers’
evaluation methods and criteria.
Given that SG efforts to introduce improved techniques to Segou cereal farmers is in its
infancy (3rd year of test plots) and SG was unable to properly test their intermediate Level B
technology, it is too soon to draw broad generalizations about the overall effort. The program
design, based on the sequential introduction of more expensive and risky technologies in this
zone of relatively poor farmers, has substantial merit. Farmers gained experience in the SG
approach the first year using the very low-risk Level A packagethey were extremely satisfied
with the results. The rapid jump up to Level C technology appears problematic given our
analysis of financial returns, BUT farmers remain enthusiastic about the higher yields obtained. 
The next few years of the program will be critical as SG searches for some combination of ARM
practices and inorganic fertilizers that can be financially sustainable over time.
Farmers were asked what could be done to improve adoption and profitability of these
technologies. Among the most frequently mentioned suggestions were: assistance with acquiring
more animal traction equipment, greater flexibility in package composition (input selection à la
carte), more timely input delivery, and better monitoring by extension agents.
77 Lessons Learned and General Implications
SG has taken a bold step by introducing high external input technologies to farmers in
risky production and marketing environments.  The program is young, but already there are
some important insights concerning the agroeconomic and socioeconomic aspects of promoting
agricultural intensification in high-risk environments of SSA.
Agro-economic lessons.  Although the technologies introduced have gotten high ratings
from farmers for increasing yields and decreasing production risk, both yield response and
aggregate yields remain modest and few farmers are producing marketable surpluses.  Without
marketable surpluses, agricultural intensification is unlikely to contribute to the development of
food marketing systems that provide all consumers (including farmers) with low-cost, reliable
food supplies -- a prerequisite for all types of broad-based economic growth.  There is strong
survey evidence that in the short-run, low-cost, improved seed and seed treatments can increase
incomes to a much greater extent than more expensive fertility enhancing technologies.  The
dilemma is that the short-run gains due to the former are unlikely to be sustained without some
increased use of the latter.  The challenge of identifying profitable soil enhancing technologies
for low-productivity, high-risk areas remains.  This requires not only more agronomic research
to identify the most productive combinations of  PNT, NPK, organic matter, and soil
conservation investments but also financial analyses to evaluate profitability and ways of
reducing input costs.
Socio-economic lessons. If agricultural intensification is to promote an agricultural
transformation capable of rendering the dire UN predictions for the year 2025 invalid, more
effort must be devoted to moving farmers in high-risk areas from a production strategy focused
on food self-sufficiency to one focused on increasing overall farm and household income. 
Survey results on farmers’ risk perceptions, use of price signals, degree of market integration,
and methods of evaluating returns to new technologies suggest a need for extension programs
focused on developing farmer skills in marketing, financial analysis, and evaluation of debt
carrying capacity.  The situation in SSA is too precarious to sit back and think that once the right
technology is identified all else will fall into place  particularly in high-risk production areas.
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